---
title: "Supabase incident on February 12, 2026"
description: "Supabase reports a 3-hour-and-42-minute outage on February 12–13, 2026, affecting every service in its us-east-2 region, including Postgres, Auth, Data APIs, Edge Functions, Storage, and Realtime. A deployment of an internal monitoring service enabled AWS VPC Block Public Access in block-bidirectional mode, blocking internet gateway traffic across production VPCs in the region. The incident response was delayed because alerts pointed toward shared services, the relevant CloudTrail event was inconspicuous, pre-production lacked us-east-2, and infrastructure specialists were not involved initially. Supabase restored connectivity by rolling back and removing the monitoring stack, then audited regions, added AWS Organizations policies and IaC safeguards, and planned account isolation, external connectivity probes, production-parity testing, and improved escalation."
---

# Supabase incident on February 12, 2026

[Supabase](https://yomu.fyi/company/supabase) · paul\_copplestone · Feb 13, 2026

**Type:** Incident / postmortem

## Summary

Supabase reports a 3-hour-and-42-minute outage on February 12–13, 2026, affecting every service in its us-east-2 region, including Postgres, Auth, Data APIs, Edge Functions, Storage, and Realtime. A deployment of an internal monitoring service enabled AWS VPC Block Public Access in block-bidirectional mode, blocking internet gateway traffic across production VPCs in the region. The incident response was delayed because alerts pointed toward shared services, the relevant CloudTrail event was inconspicuous, pre-production lacked us-east-2, and infrastructure specialists were not involved initially. Supabase restored connectivity by rolling back and removing the monitoring stack, then audited regions, added AWS Organizations policies and IaC safeguards, and planned account isolation, external connectivity probes, production-parity testing, and improved escalation.

## Context

On February 12, 2026, a regional outage affected customers with projects in us-east-2 for 3 hours and 42 minutes. The outage blocked access to Supabase services that relied on internet gateway connectivity. Private networking paths such as VPC peering and VPN connections were not affected. Resolution was delayed by misleading symptoms, incomplete pre-production coverage, an inconspicuous CloudTrail event, and the late involvement of the relevant infrastructure team.

## Approach / What changed

Supabase traced the outage to a monitoring-stack deployment that created AWS VpcBlockPublicAccessOptions in block-bidirectional mode. The team correlated deployment and outage timestamps, confirmed the monitoring stack was non-critical, and removed it, restoring network connectivity. Follow-up measures include AWS Organizations SCPs, IaC resource blocklists, separate AWS accounts for non-customer-facing services, external regional connectivity probes, production and pre-production parity, improved access controls, and faster escalation paths.

## Takeaways

- Enabling AWS VPC Block Public Access in block-bidirectional mode blocked internet gateway traffic across production VPCs in us-east-2, while traffic through VPC peering, VPN, Direct Connect, and AWS PrivateLink was unaffected.
- The outage investigation initially focused on shared-service alarms and possible AWS networking problems; correlating CloudTrail deployment timestamps with the incident identified the monitoring stack as the cause.
- Supabase plans to isolate auxiliary services in separate AWS accounts, prevent region-scoped changes through guardrails, add external connectivity probes, and expand pre-production coverage to every supported production region.

**Tags:** [AWS](https://yomu.fyi/topic/aws), [Incident Response](https://yomu.fyi/topic/incident-response), [Monitoring](https://yomu.fyi/topic/monitoring), [Reliability](https://yomu.fyi/topic/reliability)

- Source: [Supabase](https://supabase.com/blog/supabase-incident-on-february-12-2026)
- Source URL: https://supabase.com/blog/supabase-incident-on-february-12-2026
- Ingested by Yomu: 2026-08-29T04:00:48.424Z

[Read original post](https://supabase.com/blog/supabase-incident-on-february-12-2026)