How to Give an Agent a Query Language Instead of a Code Interpreter
A four-step pattern for letting a document agent write validated aggregation pipelines instead of arbitrary code, so results come back shaped and tenancy stays enforced.
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1 post about Least Privilege. Every summary links to the original.
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A four-step pattern for letting a document agent write validated aggregation pipelines instead of arbitrary code, so results come back shaped and tenancy stays enforced.
A side-by-side comparison of the two accountability models engineers actually rely on: a named human owner per outcome, and system-enforced traces, budgets, and isolation.
Application security is a closed loop: discover and prioritize risk, govern access and agent behavior, protect at runtime, then investigate and feed findings back into the next cycle.
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The Confused Deputy problem, first documented in 1988, describes a program with legitimate authority being tricked into misusing that authority on behalf of a less-privileged actor. AI agents are particularly vulnerable because they process instructions and untrusted content through the same natural-language channel, making prompt injection straightforward. The post traces this pattern through CSRF, SSRF, and recent attacks like Clinejection, where an issue-triage bot executed an attacker-supplied command from a crafted issue title. That attack led to a poisoned GitHub Actions cache and a compromised npm package downloaded 4,000 times. The fix involves task-scoped short-lived credentials, capability-scoped permissions, credential isolation from the model, and human-in-the-loop approval for high-risk actions.
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